| Afghanistan: The Next Decade By: Katie Guthrie December 10th didn’t mark just any ordinary speech. It was the day President Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, giving him an opportunity to defend the war in Afghanistan and call on the rest of the world to lend support in a global fight. The US launched the war in 2001 in response to Al Qaeda’s September 11 attacks. The 2001 invasion dislodged Al Qaeda and removed the Taliban from power, but it failed to eradicate either. “A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies – negotiations cannot convince Al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms,” Obama said. He warned that diplomacy must carry the threat of consequences for countries that threaten international security and human rights. He called upon allies. “America’s commitment to global security will never waiver. But in a world in which threats are more diffuse, and missions more complex, America cannot act alone.” NATO has promised at least 5000 troops, however, that seems small compared to the 30,000 more Obama has pledged to put on the ground by next August. Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, the deputy commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, said completing the troop increase could be delayed by 9 to 11 months. Hostile terrain, poor weather, limited ability to send supplies by air, and potential attacks on convoys carrying equipment are formidable obstacles. The troop surge will bring US forces to about 100,000. Obama simultaneously announced he would begin withdrawing American forces in July 2011. With the increase of men on the ground comes an intensified series of special operations forces in Afghanistan, said senior officials, that target important Taliban figures, instead of nearly exclusively following Al Qaeda leaders. This shift signals the first major change for the nation’s most elite military units since they arrived in Afghanistan. The change may cause controversy among officials who think U.S. military should focus primarily on the long-term fight against terrorism and eradicating Al Qaeda. Meanwhile, senior military leaders trust that pushing back the Taliban has become the main short-term priority. These efforts have gained importance since Europeans prefer to discuss “reintegration,” or peace talks, with the Taliban soon. Obama announced the following objectives in Afghanistan: deny Al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny the ability to overthrow government, and strengthen Afghanistan’s Security Forces and government. These would be met three ways: an 18-month long military strategy to break the Taliban’s momentum; cooperation with the UN and Afghan people to create a more effective civilian strategy; full recognition that success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to Pakistan. But why doesn’t the outlined strategy deal with more of the issues that have led to such violence, including poverty, unemployment, and poor education? “The strategy should also focus on crafts and agricultural sectors. The strategy should deal with these issues extensively,” said Afghan political expert and journalist Bashir Bezhan. Bezhan believes a more productive strategy focuses more on rehabilitating the Afghan market. “Investment should be made in these sectors in order to weaken the enemy. For example, the only source that welcomes a jobless, impoverished young man is the opponent side,” he said. “They join the opponent sides to receive some salary. Three hundred dollars is a good sum for a jobless and impoverished individual.” That is what has been the insurgency’s allure for many. But recently, a raise in Afghan army wages has put salaries close to the Taliban’s, which has lead to a recent wave of Afghan army recruits. Despite this recent development, President Hamid Karzai said that Afghanistan would not be able to pay for its own security until 2024, highlighting his government’s long-term financial dependence on the US and NATO. Only time will tell whether the US can adhere to the 2011 troop withdrawal or if this battle will become more reminiscent of Vietnam. |
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